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Abstract:  The  following  paper  deals  with  the  fiscal  federalism  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina  (BiH).  Besides  a  detailed  description  of  the  development  of  the  fiscal 
federalism in BiH since the Dayton peace process, the main focus of this paper is to 
illustrate  how  the  public  finance  system  in  BiH  is  designed  and  what  the  main 
differences between the Republika Srpska and the BiH Federation are. We analyse the 
revenue disparities between the cantons and their respective municipalities, which are 
boosted by the origin or rather the derivation principle in tax collection, and present an 
equalisation system based on the VAT, which can minimise the fiscal gaps mainly in 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH). Moreover, this paper highlights the 
successful process and the unsolved problems of the recently introduced Value Added 
Tax  in  BiH.  Especially  the  VAT  introduction,  the  common  Governance  Board,  the 
Indirect  Tax  Administration  (ITA)  and  the  newly  formed  common  army  and  police 
force  could  be  interpreted  as  signs  of  stabilisation  for  this  fragmented  federation. 
Although these are milestones of a peaceful coexistence between Moslem Bosniacs, 
Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats, the Bosnian fiscal federalism has only been partly 
achieved.     
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1. Introduction 
After almost four years of bloody conflict between the three ethic groups, the political 
leaders  of  the  Bosnian  Serbs,  Croats  and  Moslems  agreed  on  a  peace  agreement  at 
Wright-Patterson  Airbase  in  Dayton,  USA,  on  November  21
st,  1995.  The  General 
Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), which is also known as the Dayton Peace 
Agreement (DPA), was signed by all the political parties in Paris on December 14
th , 
1995. The DPA became the basis for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ended the 
civil  wars,  in  which  more  than  300,000  people  were  killed  and  nearly  two  million 
people became refugees. 
The  Dayton  peace  agreement  created  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (BiH)  as  a  single 
sovereign state composed of two Entities - the BiH Federation and the Republika Srpska 
-  and  the  small  District  of  Brcko.
2  While  the  BiH  Federation  itself  with  a  federal 
government in Sarajevo, ten cantons and 73 municipalities is structured as a three-tier 
fiscal system, the Republika Srpska consists of the Republican government, which is 
located in Banja Luka, and 62 municipalities only as a two-tier administrative body. 
Moreover, due to the Dayton peace agreement the Office of the High Representative 
(OHR)  exists  in  BiH,  which  is  the supreme authority for enacting laws and a huge 
number  of  political  decisions.  Therefore  BiH  is  “de  jure”  not a complete sovereign 
country, because it is still under the supervision of the OHR of the United Nations.
3 







   
 
 
Source: own illustration 
Another feature of the BiH fiscal federalism is that the central government does not 
possess  a  huge  political  influence,  because  the  Entities  have  enacted  their  own 
constitutions and are politically, administratively and fiscally autonomous. For example, 





























Governments  3 
while in the same fiscal year the Republika Srpska has possessed €778 million and the 
Federation of BiH had revenues in the amount of €1,904 million at its disposal.
5 A 
similar situation between the central government and the two Entities can be observed 
in  terms  of  the  expenditure  assignment.  Table  1  shows  the  distribution  of  the 
accountability for some areas of expenditure between the different tiers of government:  
Table 1: Distribution of the accountability for some areas of expenditure in 2005    
  Central  
Government 
BiH Federation  Republika Srpska 
    Federation  Cantons  municipalities  Republika  municipalities 
Currency policy  X           
Defence policy    X      X   
Immigration  X           
Police    X  X    X   
Fire protection      X    X   
Universities      X    X   
Salaries of teachers      X    X   
Maintenance  and 
new  building  for 
secondary schools  
      X  X   
Maintenance  and 
new  building  for 
primary schools 
      X    X 
Maintenance  and 
new  building  for 
pre-schools  
      X    X 
School buses        X    X 
Kindergarten         X    X 
Health Care      X  X  X  X 
Theatres  and 
museums 
    X    X   
Parks  and  sports 
facilities 
      X    X 
Waste management        X    X 
Electricity supply     X      X   
Water supply        X    X 
Public 
transportation 
X  X  X    X   
Roads    X  X  (X)  X  (X) 
 Source: own illustration.     4 
But not only in terms of public expenditure in BiH there is an imbalance in favour of the 
two Entities as well as the District of Brcko compared to the central government. Until 
2005 the central government was only responsible for the legislation on customs, and all 
important taxes were distributed by the derivation principle between the two Entities. 
For example, the personal income tax was levied, collected, and received completely 
independently by the RS and the FBiH. At the same time, the municipalities of the two 
Entities  had  some  small  petty  taxes
6,  but  the  main  source  of  revenues  for  the 
municipalities are shared taxes. The following table 2 points out the distribution of the 
most important taxes in Bosnia and Herzegovina:  
Table 2: Tax revenue assignments between the central government, the BIH Federation, the 
Republika Srpska and their respective municipalities.  
  Central  
Government 
BiH Federation  Republika Srpska 
    Federation  Cantons  municipalities  Republika  municipalities 
Excise in FBiH  -  100 %  -  -  -  - 
Excise in RS  -  -  -  -  100 %  - 
CIT in FBiH  -  -  100 % 
A  -  -  - 
CIT in RS   -  -  -  -  100 %  - 
Road tax in FBiH  -  45 %  55 %  -  -  - 
Road tax in RS  -  -  -  -  100%  - 
Payroll tax in RS  -  -  -  -  74 %  26 % 
Payroll tax in FBiH  -  -  80 % 
A  20 %  -  - 
PIT in RS  -  -  -  -  75 %  25 % 
PIT in FBiH  -  -  20 %  
A  80 %  -  - 
Property tax  in RS  -  -  -  -  -  100 % 
Property  tax    in 
FBIH 
-  -  20 % 
A  80 %  -  - 
Conveyance  duty  in 
RS 
-  -  -  -  -  100 % 
Conveyance  duty  in 
FBiH 
-  -  20 % 
A  80 %  -  - 
Sales tax in RS  -  -  -  -  70 %  30 % 
Sales tax in FBiH  -  -  80 % 
A  20 %-  -  - 
Customs in RS  -  -  -  -  100 %  - 
Customs in FBiH  -  100 %  -  -  -  - 
A= the tax sharing differs in every canton; see also table 3a und 3b,  Source: own illustration 
 
In an international comparison, the huge delegation of expenditure and taxation power 
in BiH from the central government to the Entities is quite unique. The weak political   5 
position of the central government is surely one of the major problems of BiH and has 
already been highlighted (see e.g. Fox / Wallich 1997, page 17, Fox / Wallich, 2001, 
page 404 or Spahn, 2002, page 19). However, this asymmetric conception or “over-
decentralisation” in BiH could be burst by the VAT introduction, which is described in 
section four. The following sections two and three deal with the local revenue structure 
in  the  FBiH  and  the  RS
7,  because  the  abolishment  of  the  sales  tax  and  the 
implementation of a nation-wide VAT have also had a major impact on the local public 
finance in BIH. 
 
2. Local Revenue Structure in the Republika Srpska  
In 2003 the total public revenues
8 in the RS amounted to €766 million and the local 
portion of these €766 million was nearly €145 million. The revenues of the cities and 
municipalities in the RS are classified in the following figure :   







fiexed portion of sales tax fixed portion of PIT 
property tax Conveyance duty
fees and charges other income 
 
          Source: own calculation as well as based on data by US AID / SiDa, 2005, page 3 
  
The  local  share  of  the  sales  tax  is  the  main  source  of  revenues  for  the  cities  and 
municipalities in the Republika Srpska. As already mentioned, all tax revenues in both 
Entities are distributed by the derivation or origin principle. Therefore the cities and 
municipalities in RS receive a fixed portion of 30% of their respective local sales tax 
yield.  Additionally,  two  big  cities  in  the  RS  –  Banja  Luka  and  Istocno  Sarajevo  – 
receive 35% of their local sales tax. Moreover, a further local portion of the respective 
sales  tax  revenues  for  every  municipality  exists  in  the  RS.  Every  three  years  the 
Ministry of Finance (MoF) in the RS divides all municipalities in four “development-
status” groups, which are conceived as follows:    6 
•  For developed municipalities the total local portion of the sales tax is still 30%, 
•  Partly-developed municipalities receive a total
9 fixed portion of 40%, 
•  Undeveloped municipalities are supported by a total fixed portion of 50% and 
•  Extremely undeveloped municipalities receive a total fixed portion of the sales 
tax of 60%. 
At first glance, these kinds of extra tax revenues for less developed municipalities could 
be  a  solution  to  reduce  the  revenue  disparities  between  the  municipalities.  But  at  a 
second glance, this form of equalisation in the RS is not reasonable, because the pure 
orientation towards the origin principle for the sales tax combined with a local portion 
aggravates the fiscal situation of weak municipalities compared to strong municipalities.  
Developed municipalities always have higher per capita sales tax revenues than weaker 
municipalities  and  this  gap  cannot  be  broadly  reduced  by  a  higher  portion  for  the 
undeveloped  municipalities  of  their  respective  lower  local  sales  tax.  Moreover,  the 
classification criteria for the “development status” of the RS Ministry of Finance is very 
non-transparent and the danger of political pork barrelling is very existent.  
The introduction of the VAT allows the renewal of the local equalisation in RS and the 
adoption of some international success stories. For example, in the United Kingdom a 
common pool for the tax revenues of the business rates exits. The business rates
10 are a 
property  tax  on  commercial  property  and  the  tax  rate  is  the  same  nation-wide.  All 
collected tax revenues belong to the municipalities, but the tax yield is not distributed 
by the origin principle, but rather by the inhabitant numbers and some other factors (for 
a detailed description see King, 2005, page 9-17) by the central government. On the one 
hand, a common pool of tax revenues lowers the tax-benefit link between the political 
decision-makers and the voters. But on the other hand, a common tax pool can reduce 
the disparities better than the current equalisation in RS. An optimal local equalisation 
system, which equalises the tax revenue disparities as well as the expenditure needs, can 
be observed in Sweden (for a detailed description see Werner / Shah, 2005a). However, 
the  MoF  in  the  RS  does  not  possess  such  a  statistical  background  as  their  Nordic 
counterparts and therefore a horizontal equalisation like in Sweden or Denmark cannot 
be implemented in the Balkan region yet. However, some useful advice for a future 
conception of the VAT sharing and the resulting equalisation impact can be observed in 
the equalisation among the federal states in Germany. The German VAT revenues are 
distributed by tax sharing between the central government, 16 (federal) states and the   7 
local  authorities  (see  Spahn,  1997,  Werner,  2003  and  Spahn  /  Werner,  2004).  The 
respective fixed portion of the VAT is firstly allocated to the federal states based on the 
number of inhabitants. Moreover, the economically weak states obtain an additional 
portion of the respective states' VAT tax share, which guarantees a minimum tax yield 
of 92% of the nation-wide average for all states.  
Whatever the MoF of the Republika Srpska will decide, the actual conception could not 
be used anymore because the replacement of the sales tax does not allow for the use of 
the origin principle.    
3. Local Revenue Structure in the Federation of BIH   
The ten cantons of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have the revenues of the 
sales tax, the corporate income tax, the payroll tax and the wage taxes at their disposal. 
The cantons share these tax revenues with their municipalities, but the degree of the tax 
sharing  differs  extremely  between  the  ten  cantons.  The  following  tables  3a  and  3b 
describe the respective tax sharing of the cantons and their municipalities in the fiscal 
year of 2003:  
Table 3a : Tax sharing between the municipalities and the cantons in 2003  
  CIT  Payroll tax  PIT  Property tax  Conveyance duty 
  cantonal  local  cantonal  local  cantonal  local  cantonal  local  cantonal  local 
Una Sana  50 %  50 %  75 %  25 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 % 
Posavina  100 %  0 %  80 %  20 %  70 %  30 %  50 %  50 %  50 %   50 % 
Tuzla 
Prodrinje 
100 %  0 %  80 %  20 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 % 
Zenica 
Doboj 
100 %  0 %  80 %  20 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 % 
Bosna 
Prodrinje 
50 %  50 %  80 %  20 %   50 %  50 %  50 %  50 %  50 %  50 % 
Central 
Bosnia 
100 %  0 %  80 %  20 %  0 %  100 %  20 %  80 %  5 %  95 % 
Herzegovina 
Neretva 
100 %  0 %  50 %  50 %  50 %  50 %  50 %  50 %  20 %  80 % 
West 
Herzegovina 
100 %  0 %  50 %  50 %  80 %  20 %  0 %  100 %  50 %  50 % 
Sarajevo  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  60 %  40 %  0 %  100 % 
Herceg 
Bosna 
80 %  20 %  60 %  40 %  75 %  25 %  75 %  25 %  30 %  70 % 
Source: own illustration    8 
Table 3b : Tax sharing between the municipalities and the cantons in 2003  
  lottery tax  sales tax –      
low tariff  
sales tax –      
high tariff 




  cantonal  local  cantonal  local  cantonal  local  cantonal  local  cantonal  local 
Una Sana  0 %  100%  80 %  20%  80 %  20%  -  -  50 %  50 % 
Posavina  50 %  50 %  80 %  20 %  80 %  20 %  -  -  0 %  100 % 
Tuzla 
Prodrinje 
100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  70 %  30 %  -  -  100 %  0 % 
Zenica 
Doboj 
0 %  100%  100 %  0 %  80 %  20 %  -  -  100 %   0 % 
Bosna 
Prodrinje 
50 %  50 %  80 %  20 %  80 %  20 %  -  -  50 %  50 % 
Central 
Bosnia 
20 %  80 %  100 %  0 %  80 %   20 %  -  -  20 %  80 % 
Herzegovina 
Neretva 
50 %  50 %  100 %  0 %  75 %  25 %  -  -  50 %  50 % 
West 
Herzegovina 
0 %  100%   75 %  25 %  75 %  25 %  0  100  20 %  80 % 
Sarajevo  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  100 %  0 %  -  -  100 %  0 % 
Herceg 
Bosna 
75 %  25 %  75 %  25 %  75%  25 %  -  -  0 %  100 % 
Source: own illustration  
In 2003, the municipalities of the FBiH possessed €137 million, which can be classified 
as follows:    







fiexed portion of sales tax fixed portion of PIT 
property tax + conveyance duty petty taxes
fees and charges grants
other income 
       Source: own calculation as well as based on data by US AID / SiDa, 2005, page 8 
    9 
Compared  to  their  counterparts  in  the  RS,  the  municipalities  of  the  FBiH  own 
absolutely and relatively less and the small influence of the shared taxes – mainly from 
the tax sharing of the sales tax – is striking. The smaller influence of the sales tax results 
from the fact that the canton of Sarajevo, which is the richest of all ten cantons in FBiH, 
does not provide for sales tax sharing but rather for a vertical transfer of grants to its 
respective municipalities.
11  
The fiscal gaps between the cantons as well as the municipalities, which are boosted by 
the origin or derivation principle in terms of tax collection, are huge. Moreover, in the 
FBiH no equalisation system exists. The VAT introduction, which is the topic in the 
next section in detail, could be a solution to minimise these revenue disparities. 
Some parts of the German VAT revenues are used to equalise the fiscal capacities of the 
federal states (see e.g. Spahn / Föttinger, 1997, Guihéry, 2001, Lenk 2001, Spahn / 
Franz,  2002,  Werner  /  Xue,  2003  and  Werner  /  Shah,  2005b).  The  German  VAT 
equalisation formula has two advantages for the Fiscal Federalism in Bosnia in general 
and in particular for the FBiH. Firstly, using only the respective inhabitant numbers and 
the fiscal capacity measure allows this kind of VAT equalisation a fairly transparent and 
simple  administration.  An  extremely  complex  and  non-transparent  system  like  for 
example the Australian Grant Commission would produce a political defence reaction 
and could also overburden the small administration staff numbers, which nowadays do 
not  have  the  actual  inhabitant  numbers  of  Bosnia  at  all.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the 
Australian Grant Commission also has some advantages (see Rye and Searle, 1997), but 
as for the Scandinavian system of expenditure needs equalisation, the collection of such 
data in BiH is currently not possible or is too costly.   
Secondly,  the  VAT  is  a  completely  new  tax  in  Bosnia  and  therefore  –  besides  the 
constitutional discussion about the ownership of these extra revenues between all tiers 
of government – the new VAT is a good possibility to release the local authority and the 
weak  subnational  cantons  from  their  fiscal  dormancy.  Moreover,  the  German  fiscal 
system has a good reputation with Bosnia's political decision-makers, which manifested 
itself in the currency board of the German DM and the Bosnian KM. 
Using the German VAT equalisation as a spin-off of a fiscal reform, our suggestion can 
be summarised as follows: The origin principle for the VAT is not reasonable and the 
used  single  account  conception  fortunately  avoids  this  situation.  The  whole  VAT 
revenues  have  to  be  collected  in  a  common  pool  and  from  this  pool  the  central 
government, the two Entities and the district of Brcko receive their fixed portion. Inside   10 
the FBiH all VAT revenues belong to the cantons and are distributed by the following 
steps:  
1.  As regards the cantonal allocation of VAT revenue, at least 75% of VAT has to 
be distributed among the cantons according to the number of inhabitants. 
2.  The  remaining  25%  is  distributed  among  the  financially  weak  cantons  to 
guarantee  a  minimum  of  92%  of  the  cantonal  average  per  capita.  The 
measurement  of  the  cantonal  average  includes  all  other  tax  revenues  of  the 
cantons and their respective municipalities. The 100% consideration of the local 
tax  revenues  is  one  of  the  major  differences  as  opposed  to  the  German 
equalisation, which considers only 64% of the local tax revenues.
12 
3.  If – after strengthening the financially weak cantons – a residue of the remaining 
25%  exists,  this  residue  is  transferred  again  to  all  cantons  based  on  the 
inhabitant numbers. However, in this third step the inhabitant number of the 
densely  populated  canton  of  Sarajevo  is  readjusted  with the factor of 1.3. A 
readjustment of sparsely populated cantons is excluded and the population of all 
other nine cantons is weighted with the factor 1.0
13  
The following figure 3 demonstrates that the equalisation effect of the first two steps is 
already extremely significant compared to the fiscal year of 2003: 
Figure 3: Per capita tax revenues of the cantons and their respective municipalities in 2003 (all tax 
revenues including sales tax) compared to 2006 (all tax revenues including 75% VAT)
14: 











cantons + cities with sales tax in 2003 cantons + cities with 75 %VAT in 2006
 
      Source: own calculation, the cantonal average amounts to 1,0 in both years and is measured  
      separately in both years. 
 
Figure  4  highlights  the  final  equalisation  effect  of  the  100%  VAT  distribution  and 
points out the fiscal difference from step # 2 to # 3 in our estimation:    11 
Figure 4: Per capita tax revenues of the cantons and their respective municipalities in 2006 with a 
portion of 75 % VAT and a 100 % distribution of the VAT 











cantons + cities with 75 % VAT in 2006 cantons + cities with 100 % VAT in 2006
 
       Source: own calculation 
 
4. The VAT introduction 
During the entire post-war period, the sales taxes were the dominant source of revenues 
in BiH. In 2003 the sales tax revenues accounted for somewhat more than 40% of the 
total tax revenues in BiH. Until the start of 2005, the two Entities and the District of 
Brcko  had  three  separate  and  non-harmonised  laws  regulating  the  sales  taxes.  The 
differences  between  the  three  laws  were  significant  and  included  different  rates, 
numbers of reduced rates as well as tax bases to which these rates were applied. These 
differences naturally induced arbitrage and produced market distortions. Furthermore, 
very  little  cooperation  existed  between  the  individual  tax  administrations,  which 
resulted in massive tax evasion and substantial revenue losses. Importers and retailers 
from the RS often declared fictitious sales in the Federation and vice versa while selling 
goods tax-free on the black market. Such evasion schemes were especially attractive for 
importers and retailers of heavily taxed excisable goods such as oil
15. The ability to 
make  high  profit  margins  from  selling  oil  on  the  black  market  has  led  to  the 
phenomenon of abundant petrol stations in BiH. For example, even today there are more 
than 20 petrol stations operating on the 60km road from Banja Luka to Gradiska. The 
lack  of  coordination  was  also  present  with  other  indirect  taxes,  e.g.  excises,  where 
domestic producers of excisable products that wanted to sell in both Entities were faced 
with double taxation and a complicated reimbursement process. Due to this reason, the   12 
only domestic oil refinery in Brod in the Republika Srpska was, for a long time, kept 
out of the oil market in the Federation.  
The lists of the exempted goods under the three Sales Tax Laws were extensive and 
differed  between  the  three  laws.  The  main  exemptions  consisted  of  the  basic  food 
products (bread, milk, oil, etc.), exported goods, reconstruction materials and equipment 
for agricultural production. The long lists of exemptions and the dispersion of tax rates 
aggravated the problems of tax compliance and erosion of the tax base.  
The coordination between the Entities on taxation issues has been improved gradually 
through  a  number  of  agreements.  The  goal  was  to  improve  cooperation  and  the 
exchange of information between the Entity tax administrations and Brcko as well to 
harmonise the tax laws. The following table 4 shows the sales tax rates prescribed by 
the  Entity  laws  before  the  full  harmonisation  was  reached.  In  2003,  as  one  of  the 
attempts to tackle the tax evasion, the point of collection of the sales taxes on imported 
excisable goods was relocated from retailers to the border. This change was followed 
with a surge in revenues from this source confirming the suspicion that a significant 
share of excisable goods had been channelled through the black market by the use of 
fictitious  companies.  One  of  the  agreements  aimed  at  strengthening  the  single  BiH 
market is the so called “Mrakovica Agreement” where the Prime Ministers of the FBIH 
and the RS concluded that the excises on the inter-Entity sales would be paid only at the 
point of production in order to avoid double taxation.  
Table 4: Sales tax rates applied in the BiH Federation and the Republika Srpska  
Year     FBiH  RS
16 
1998  goods  5 %, 10 %, 15 %, 20%  10 %, 20 % 
  services  10 % 15 % 30 %  10 % 
2004  goods  10 % 20 %  10 %, 20 % 
  services  10 %  10 %% 
          Source: own illustration  
 
Recognising the need to tackle the cross-Entity tax evasion through a painful process of 
political  negotiations  and  under  a  watchful  eye  of  the  international  community,  a 
political consensus was reached to shift the responsibility for indirect taxation to the 
state  level.  In  late  2003,  the  state  parliament  adopted  the  Law on Indirect Taxation 
System (ITS Law) and established a joint institution responsible for indirect taxation in 
the whole territory of BiH - Indirect Taxation Authority (ITA). After its establishment, 
the ITA worked in close cooperation with the European Customs and Fiscal Assistance 
Office (CAFAO) on the introduction of the long-expected VAT set for 2006.   13 
In the interim period, starting from January 2005, the ITA assumed responsibility for 
the collection of import duties, road fees, excises and sales tax on excisable goods. A 
state-wide single account was established for payments of the taxes collected by the 
ITA. The sales tax on non-excisable goods, as well as the sales tax on services remained 
under the control of the Entity tax administrations until 2006. Table 5 presents indirect 
tax revenues for the single account. 
Table 5: The single account revenues in 2005 and 2006 (estimated)  
  2005  2006  Increase in % 
VAT  € 0.0 million  € 936.43 million  --- 
Customs duties  € 309.64 million  € 281.47 million  -9.1% 
Excises  € 399.32 million  € 428.16 million  +7.2 % 
Imported   € 304.83 million  € 326.87 million  +7.2 % 
Domestic  € 155.86 million  € 101.29 million  +7.2 % 
Sales tax  € 275.59 million  € 35.84 million  -87% 
On imported goods   € 208.04 million  € 26.28 million  -87.4 % 
On domestic goods  € 61.36 million  € 9.56 million  -84.4 % 
Other  € 6.13 million  € 9.56 million  +55.3% 
Road tax  € 84.21 million  € 92.19 million  +9.5% 
Other tax  € 3.17 million  € 0 million  -100 % 
Total  € 1 076.78 million  € 1 774.08 million  +64.8 % 
           Source: Macroeconomic Unit of the GB of ITA and own estimation  
 
The ITS Law determines that the revenues from the Single Account are to be regularly 
distributed in the following order: 
1) the amount is transferred to the state budget based on the current year's state budget,  
2) the share of the remaining amount to be transferred to the Federation, to RS and to 
Brcko is determined by their share of the final consumption,  
3) the amount needed to finance international debt obligations is deducted from the 
shares of the Federation and RS and is paid directly to the state budget.  
The Governing Board (GB)
17 of the ITA reached an agreement that the shares of the 
final consumption of the FBiH, the RS and the District of Brcko were to be calculated 
monthly from the corresponding shares of the sales tax base. The GB also prescribed the 
methodology for the calculation of the shares. However, the monthly shares had not 
been  calculated  in  2005,  but  instead,  a  fixed  share  from  June  2004  was  applied 
throughout  2005.  Recalculation  of  the  shares  in  mid-2005  was  associated  with  a 
significant shift in the shares, which led to a cycle of disputes on the accuracy of data   14 
submitted by the ITA and the Entities as well as on the methodology of calculating the 
shares. Consequently, the GB has been unable to reach an agreement on this issue until 
today.   
BiH was the last country in the Balkans region to introduce VAT. The Law on VAT 
was adopted by the Parliament of BiH in January 2005. Drafted under the guidance of 
CAFAO, the law was designed to be consistent with the Sixth European VAT Directive.   
Unlike the case of the EU member countries and neighbouring countries of BiH, the 
VAT rate in BiH was set to a single rate of 17%.
18 Despite significant political pressure 
from the opposition parties in the state parliament to introduce a reduced rate for those 
goods that were treated favourably under the sales tax system, a case was made to start 
the  introduction  of  VAT  with  a  single  rate:  reduced  rates  increase  administrative 
expenses  and,  at  the  same  time,  create  incentives  for  false  reporting  and 
misclassification. They significantly complicate the reporting and control systems and 
increase the number of refund situations. Furthermore, the introduction of reduced rates 
represents an inefficient policy to relieve the tax burden on the low-income households 
as such policies extend to the entire society.  
The exemptions embedded in the BiH VAT Law reflect the requirement of the Sixth 
VAT Directive to exempt certain goods and services. The IMF estimated that these 
exemptions reduce the tax base of BiH by €283 million. The exempted sectors, such as 
education, health, financial and social services, by definition do not charge VAT on 
their sales. On the other hand, tax credits are not allowed for these sectors. That is, these 
sectors are not able to deduct VAT paid for their inputs. Only the exported goods have 
been granted “full exemption” (with tax credit). Such exemptions are also referred to as 
“zero-rating”.  In  the  last  few  months  before  the  introduction  of  VAT  in  BiH,  the 
constantly present requests from various interest groups to extend the list of exempted 
goods  and  services  have  become  more  pronounced.  Some  of  these  requests  have 
undergone  parliament  procedure  and  are  yet  to  be  voted  on.  It  remains  to  be  seen 
whether and when the first amendments to the Law on VAT regarding the exempted 
sectors are to be introduced. 
As already mentioned, the VAT revenues are distributed jointly with other indirect taxes 
from  the  Single  Account.  The  ITS  Law  foresees  that  the  apportionment  of  funds 
between the Entities and Brcko is done in accordance with the associated shares of the 
final  consumption  as  revealed  by  VAT  returns.  However,  the  methodology  for  the 
calculation of the shares was not determined before the introduction of VAT in January   15 
2006. This has caused disruptions in revenue distribution and aggravated the problem of 
budget uncertainty for all budget units in the country.
19 There have been proposals to 
introduce an interim solution (a set of coefficients for apportionment based on historical 
shares or similar) for the initial year of the VAT introduction until the revenues and 
associated monthly shares of the final consumption have stabilised. Table 6 displays the 
distribution of revenues from the single account in 2005. 
Table 6: Distribution of revenues from the Single Account in 2005 between all tiers of government  
  in € million  in % 
Refunds  0.46  0.0 
Central government  128.59  11.9 
FBIH gross  622.7  57.8 
FBIH net  551.02  51.2 
Debt service  71.68  6.7 
RS gross  288.88  26.8 
RS net  243.37  22.6 
Debt service  45.5  4.2 
District of Brcko   35.94  3.3 
Total   1 076.53  100 
                                     Source: own estimation  
 
5.Conclusion  
One of the major features of the Bosnian fiscal federalism – a weak central government, 
which  is  financed  by  the  two  entities  without  any  taxation  right  –  is  quite  unique 
worldwide. The VAT introduction and its institutional “ancestor” – namely the  Single 
Account – will strengthen the fiscal independence of the central government. However, 
all political decision makers have not agreed yet on how to distribute the VAT revenues 
between all tiers of government, which is very unusual due to the fact that the new tax 
has already been collected since the beginning of 2006.  
Therefore, we used the German VAT equalisation as a spin-off of a fiscal reform, but 
we have deleted some characteristics of the German equalisation system which could 
have a negative impact in BiH. For example, our suggestion is not based on vertical 
grants by the central government. In Germany  two kinds of these vertical grants exist: 
deficit  coverage  funds  and  special  requirement  funds.  The  application  of  the  deficit 
coverage funds with a general equalisation up to a national average of 99.5 % would  
reduce the incentives of all economically weak cantons to raise extra tax yields, and the 
special  requirement  funds    in  Germany  are  mainly  the  result  of  the  German 
reunification. Moreover, we want to avoid the bail-out problem (see Seitz, 2000 Spahn / 
Werner,  2004  and  Rodden,  2005),  and  with  a  maximum  of  95%    equalisation 
nationwide we want to develop enough positive incentives to increase the tax collection.   16 
Furthermore, it has to be  borne in mind that the subnational tax sovereignty is very low 
in Germany, because all important taxes are shared between the central government, the 
states (Länder) and the local authorities (see Guihéry / Werner, 2005). If in the future 
the cantons  receive their own tax sovereignty, a further adaptation of the equalisation 
system  will  be  required.  The  Canadian  equalisation  system  is  interesting  for  BiH, 
because this country also offers  a heterogeneity of different forms of cultural heritage 
with the major French speaking province of Quebec, the bilingual mixed province of 
New Brunswick and the eight English-speaking  Anglo-Saxon Provinces. One the one 
hand, Canada has one of the highest forms of subnational tax sovereignty (see Hayashi / 
Boadway, 2001 and Esteller-Moré / Solé-Ollé , 2002) in the world, but on the other 
hand the economically weak provinces, which are mostly located on the Atlantic Ocean 
coastline,  are  heavily  influenced  by  the  vertical  equalisation  grants  of  the  central 
government in Ottawa.  
The Canadian transfer system consists of four
20 pillars: the Canadian Health Transfer 
(CHT), the Canadian Social Transfer (CST), the Territorial Formula Financing (TFF) 
and the Canadian equalisation. The following figure 5 demonstrates the fiscal impact of 
all four pillars in the fiscal year of 2005-2006 
Figure 5: Transfer from the Canadian central government to the provinces in the fiscal year of 
2005-2006 (measured in CAN $ per capita) 
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New Brunswick 
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Equalisation CHS,CST and WTRT
 
   Source: own illustration  
 
We are going to discuss the Canadian equalisation, because it is based on the fiscal 
capacity  of  every  province.  The  measurement  of  the  fiscal  capacity  includes  33 
provincial  tax  bases
21.    With  clear  transparency  and  low  cost  of  administration,  the   17 
Canadian system has similar advantages to the German equalisation system compared to 
their  counterparts  in  other  federal  or  unitary  countries.  In  contrast  to  the  German 
equalisation  system,  the  Canadian  equalisation  allows  the  reflection  of  different 
subnational tax rates. If the Bosnian cantons  once receive a surcharge  on the CIT or the 
PIT, the Canadian equalisation system could  surely  be borne in mind. Nevertheless, 
the  Canadian  transfer  system  cannot  avoid  political  pork  barrelling  (see  Milligan  / 
Smart, 2005), which  especially in such a tense political situation like in BiH is not very 
reasonable.    
The acceptability to the population and the different interest groups is also essential for 
the success of the reform of the fiscal system of BiH. This is not easy as many players  
are involved and as some players of this long-term positive sum game will lose some 
revenues in our suggested redistribution mechanism of the VAT revenues in a short-
term perspective like for example the canton of Sarajevo. But for the long-term goal of 
the majority of the population and the politicians in BiH – membership of the European 
Union  –  these  reforms  are  necessary.  If  the  people  of  BiH  discuss  these    political 
decisions  instead  of  such  nationalistic  questions  such  as  what    name  to  give  to  the 
airport in Sarajevo and how every ethic group acted during the last international soccer 
game between BiH and Serbia-Montenegro, the still existing wounds of the civil war 
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6. Appendix 
Figure A1: Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina  
 
Table A1:  Tax and non tax revenues for BiH in the fiscal year 1999 (in €million ) 
  BiH Federation  Republika Srpska  Total 
BiH 












Total taxes  346.66  637.22  983.88  266.95  32.82  299.77  1283.65 
Sales tax   0.0  387.71  387,71  54.35  19.22  73.57  461.28 
Excise  160.03  0.0  160.03  43.51  1.69  45.2  205.23 
Customs  177.42  0.0  177.42  72.19  0.0  72.19  249.61 
PIT / CIT  9.2  135.44  144.64  25.41  6.6  32.01  176.65 
Property tax   0.0  17.18  17.18  0.0  2.35  2.35  19.53 
Gift & death 
tax 
0.0  0.26  0.26  0.0  0.15  0.15  0.41 
Gambling tax   0.0  0.15  0.15  0.0  0.25  0.25  0.4 
Fees and 
citizen tax 
0.0  55.47  55.47  0.0  25.16  25.16  80.63 
Other taxes  0.0  41.01  41.01  46.32  2.5  48.82  89.83 
Total social 
contributions 
472.43  0.0  472.43  156.15  0.0  156.15  628.58 
Pension fund  254.11  0.0  254.11  78.38  0.0  78.38  332.49 
Employment 
fund 
29.14  0.0  29.14  13.24  0.0  13.24  42.38 
Health fund  189.18  0.0  189.18  64.53  0.0  64.53  253.71 
Source: own calculation based on Fox / Wallich, 2003, page 474 and Fox, 2003, page 7   19 
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             Source: own calculation  
 
Figure A3: Total revenue structure of the municipalities by canton 
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Source: own illustration mainly based on data by US AID / SiDa, 2005, page 7 
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